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Two Key Steps in the Evolution of
Human Cooperation
The Interdependence Hypothesis
by Michael Tomasello, Alicia P. Melis, Claudio Tennie,
Emily Wyman, and Esther Herrmann
Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation focus mainly on altruism. In contrast, we propose that
humans’ species-unique forms of cooperation—as well as their species-unique forms of cognition, communication,
and social life—all derive from mutualistic collaboration (with social selection against cheaters). In a first step,
humans became obligate collaborative foragers such that individuals were interdependent with one another and so
had a direct interest in the well-being of their partners. In this context, they evolved new skills and motivations for
collaboration not possessed by other great apes (joint intentionality), and they helped their potential partners (and
avoided cheaters). In a second step, these new collaborative skills and motivations were scaled up to group life in
general, as modern humans faced competition from other groups. As part of this new group-mindedness, they
created cultural conventions, norms, and institutions (all characterized by collective intentionality), with knowledge
of a specific set of these marking individuals as members of a particular cultural group. Human cognition and
sociality thus became ever more collaborative and altruistic as human individuals became ever more interdependent.
As compared with other primates, human beings are inor-
dinately cooperative, especially with nonrelatives. As is well
known since Darwin, this creates challenges for evolutionary
explanation, since in modern evolutionary theory, cooperative
behavior must always be grounded in the individual and in-
clusive fitness of the cooperator.
In this modern context, there are two main theories of the
evolution of human cooperation, both of which focus on the
most difficult theoretical problem from the point of view of
evolutionary theory: altruism. The first theory comes from
evolutionary psychology and is often called the Big Mistake
Hypothesis (e.g., Burnham and Johnson 2005). The basic idea
is that human altruistic tendencies evolved at a time when
humans lived in small groups, comprised mostly of kin. In
this setting, altruistic acts would either (a) benefit kin, and
so evolve due to kin selection, or else (b) benefit the altruist
by enhancing in some way her chances for reciprocity, which
is especially critical in small groups in which reputational
assessment among familiar interactants is constant. In the
modern world, even in the midst of strangers or even when
not being observed by others at all, humans nevertheless have
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some tendency toward altruism (and antipathy toward cheat-
ers) because the proximate mechanism operates as if the an-
cient, small-group conditions still held.
The second theory is the Cultural Group Selection Hy-
pothesis (e.g., Henrich and Henrich 2007; Richerson and
Boyd 2005), and it focuses on a later stage in human evolution
characterized by larger social groups. The basic idea is that
social groups with more altruists will, for various reasons,
outcompete other groups. The difference from previous group
selection hypotheses is that the main transmission across gen-
erations takes place not genetically but culturally. For other
reasons, modern humans are built to imitate others (e.g.,
successful others or the majority), and so if a group has al-
truists, others will often imitate them, and that will lead to
group success. As groups become larger in scale, those that
create social norms and institutions that better promote al-
truism will again thrive relative to others. No biological ad-
aptations for altruism are necessarily involved here, but the
theory does allow for later gene-culture coevolution in which
individuals biologically adapt to life in a culture characterized
by conformist social transmission, group punishment and
norms, and group competition.
In what follows, we propose an approach to the evolution
of human cooperation that begins in a different place. Our
starting point is not cooperation as altruistic helping, but
rather cooperation as mutualistic collaboration. Our hypoth-
esis, which we call the Interdependence Hypothesis, is that at
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some point humans created lifeways in which collaborating
with others was necessary for survival and procreation (and
cheating was controlled by partner choice). This situation of
interdependence led inevitably to altruism, as individuals nat-
urally wanted to help the collaborative partners on whom
they depended for, for example, foraging success. Moreover,
interdependent collaboration also helps to explain humans’
unique forms of cognition and social organization, since it is
collaboration, not altruism, that creates the many coordina-
tion problems that arise as individuals attempt to put their
heads together in acts of shared intentionality1 to create and
maintain the complex technologies, symbol systems, and cul-
tural institutions of modern human societies.
Our evolutionary story comprises two distinct steps, the
first focusing on small-scale contexts (though we focus on
aspects different from the Big Mistake Hypothesis) and the
second focusing on group-level contexts (though we focus on
aspects different from the Cultural Group Selection Hypoth-
esis). First, small-scale collaboration involving cognitively
complex coordination problems took place initially, we will
argue, in the context of collaborative foraging. Although hu-
mans’ more stable reproductive bonds (Chapais 2008) and
cooperative breeding (Hrdy 2009) clearly played an important
role in establishing the motivational and emotional founda-
tions, the cognitive dimension of human cooperation evolved
in contexts in which, in order to acquire food, individuals
had to create together various coordination strategies (often
involving technologies), which they then could communicate
cooperatively to others within and across generations (Ster-
elny 2012). Second, group-level collaboration followed as the
entire social group needed to work together interdependently
in order to compete with other social groups, leading to such
things as group-created conventions, norms, and institutions.
This step was undoubtedly followed by something like cultural
group selection, but cultural group selection explains why the
particular social norms and institutions of particular cultural
groups have prevailed, and this assumes species-universal
skills and motivations—such as those we will posit—for cre-
ating social norms and institutions in the first place.
In support of our hypotheses, we focus on two sources of
evidence not common in anthropology. First, we invoke ex-
perimental studies, many from our own laboratory, that com-
pare the cognitive and motivational skills of humans, mostly
young children, and their nearest great ape relatives (as rep-
resentative, in a very general way, of the last common an-
cestor). We show that even young children are adapted for
collaborative activities in a way that other great apes are not.
Second, we also in some cases invoke human ontogenetic
1. Here we use the term “shared intentionality” to refer to collaborative
phenomena in general. We use the term “joint intentionality” for the ad
hoc, temporary collaborations characteristic of, e.g., foraging parties (step
1 of our story) and the term “collective intentionality” for the more
impersonal yet permanent group-minded practices and modes of col-
laboration that characterize cultural groups as a whole (step 2 of our
story).
sequences as suggestive of potential phylogenetic sequences,
for example, that young children in fact (and possibly of
logical necessity) learn to collaborate with other individuals
in concrete situations before they construct more abstract
group-level phenomena such as social norms and institutions.
We invoke observations of modern foragers and some paleo-
anthropological data, as is more customary in evolutionary
theorizing, in a few places as well.
First Step: Obligate Collaborative Foraging
The central challenge of social life is often presented as a
Prisoner’s Dilemma in which the individual must choose be-
tween its own well-being and that of the group. But the Pris-
oner’s Dilemma arises only in very special circumstances, and
it does indeed tend to block cooperation. A better model for
real-life cooperation is the Stag Hunt (Skyrms 2004). Stag
Hunt situations are those in which (i) individuals must col-
laborate with others to benefit, (ii) the benefits of the collab-
oration are greater than those of any solo alternatives, and
(iii) all solo alternatives must be forsaken (risked) in order
to collaborate. In the classic parable, I am hunting alone for
hares when I spy a stag—which is much better food but which
I cannot capture alone. You are in exactly the same situation,
and so it is in both our interests to drop our pursuit of hares
and collaborate to capture the stag and then share the spoils.
(This general scenario can easily be extended to other foraging
activities, including many gathering activities such as pro-
curing honey collaboratively.)
Human collaborative foraging first occurred, we hypoth-
esize, in Stag Hunt–type situations in which all participants
had alternatives but anticipated an even greater benefit from
successful capturing of the stag (see Alvard 2012). Although
much of the foraging of contemporary hunter-gatherers is
only loosely collaborative, this is very likely because modern
foragers have the kinds of projectile weapons that enable in-
dividuals to be successful (from a safe distance) where pre-
viously only small groups of individuals working together
could attain foraging success (and contemporary foragers also
see themselves as part of a group, as in our step 2 [see below],
and so bring the bounty back to the home base for sharing).
In stark contrast, nonhuman great apes—and so, by hypoth-
esis, the last common ancestor—were and are almost exclu-
sively individual foragers. Chimpanzees and bonobos may
search for food in small social groups, but when they find
food, each individual procures and consumes it on its own
(with sharing only under special circumstances). They do not
extract or otherwise obtain food by working collaboratively
with others, nor do they, as humans do, bring food back to
some central location to provision others.
The one potential exception is the group hunting of mon-
keys by some (but not all) groups of chimpanzees (Boesch
and Boesch 1989; Watts and Mitani 2002). What happens
prototypically is that a small party of male chimpanzees spies
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a red colobus monkey somewhat separated from its group,
and they proceed to surround and capture it (normally one
individual begins the chase and others scramble to the mon-
key’s possible escape routes). One individual actually captures
the monkey, but all participants usually end up getting at least
some meat. Chimpanzee group hunting can be reasonably
modeled as a Stag Hunt situation, since it is difficult for
individuals to capture monkeys on their own, and they always
have other, less exciting alternative foods potentially available.
If the many collaborative foraging activities of humans and
the one collaborative foraging activity of great apes represent
Stag Hunt–type situations, we may compare humans and their
nearest great ape relatives in terms of their proximate mech-
anisms, both cognitive and motivational, for operating in such
situations. We may best do this by telling a very general evo-
lutionary story (supported by comparative experimental data)
about how humans developed new strategies to meet the three
main challenges to Stag Hunt collaboration as an evolution-
arily stable subsistence strategy:
a) Sharing the spoils: individuals had to find some way to
divide the spoils at the end of the collaboration such that
there was no destructive fighting and such that everyone was
incentivized for future stag hunting.
b) Coordination: individuals had to find some way to make
a confidence-inspiring “group decision” about whether to go
for the stag, given that each of them had to relinquish their
“hare in the hand” to do so.
c) Temptations to free ride: individuals had to solve the
problem that if there were more people present than were
needed to capture the stag (but all could eat), then everyone
had an incentive to let the others do the hard and risky work
of stag killing—resulting in inaction from everyone.
In their group hunting of monkeys, chimpanzees have ways
of meeting all three of these challenges. But humans have
come to meet them in some demonstrably different ways,
using species-unique proximate mechanisms.
Sharing the Spoils
Chimpanzees, like most primates, are mostly herbivorous
(and insectivorous). They forage in small social parties mainly
for ripe fruit and some insects, consuming other vegetation
as backup. When the party finds a patch of fruit, typically
everyone gets some by scrambling, which works well because
the fruit is at least moderately spread out in the tree or on
the ground. If they encounter monopolizable food, the en-
suing contest-competition will go to the dominant individual
in typical mammalian fashion.
The consequences of this way of doing business for col-
laboration may be clearly seen in a recent experiment. Melis,
Hare, and Tomasello (2006b) presented pairs of chimpanzees
with out-of-reach food on a platform that could be obtained
only if both individuals pulled simultaneously on the two
ends of a rope. When there were two piles of food, one in
front of each individual, the pair often collaborated success-
fully. However, when there was only one pile of food in the
middle of the platform, pulling it in often resulted in the
dominant individual monopolizing all of the food. This nat-
urally demotivated the subordinate for future collaboration
with this individual, and so cooperation fell apart over trials.
Chimpanzees’ predominant solution to food competition in
general, namely, dominance, tends to destabilize collaborative
foraging over time.
So why does not dominance undermine chimpanzees’
group hunting of monkeys? The answer is twofold. First, dom-
inant chimpanzees do not normally take small parcels of food
away from subordinates who already have it in their grasp.
So if the captor of the monkey is subordinate, he nevertheless
is typically able to eat his fill. Second, even if the captor is
dominant, he cannot monopolize the carcass himself because
it is too big. As with social carnivores like lions and wolves,
trying to protect a large carcass with other hungry individuals
approaching is a losing battle. After the kill, noncaptors harass
the captor (no matter his dominance) and obtain pieces of
meat from the too-big-to-monopolize carcass, with those who
harass most getting the most meat (Gilby 2006). Although
there is some favoritism in “meat sharing” toward coalitionary
partners (Mitani and Watts 2001), the most important factor
in noncaptors’ obtaining of meat is, not surprisingly, domi-
nance (Boesch 1994).
Humans share their spoils differently. Contemporary
hunter-gatherers routinely share the spoils of their collabo-
rative foraging on the scene, without harassment, and large
packets of food are almost always brought back to some cen-
tral location and shared with nonparticipants (Gurven 2004).
Different cultural groups may do this differently, and it may
work differently with particular resources, but there are no
human groups who behave like other great apes in simply
scrambling for food competitively in most situations, with
dominants taking all that they can regardless of others. And
unlike great apes, humans actively provision their children
with food for many years, with human children being well
into their teens in most cases before they actually pull their
own weight (Hill 1993).
In experiments, humans are much more generous with
food than are chimpanzees, and they expect their conspecifics
to be more generous (even fair) as well. Thus, in economic
games, humans routinely take into account the needs and
desires of others, whereas this is not the case for chimpanzees.
For example, humans routinely give a significant portion of
some windfall resource to an unknown individual in dictator
games, whereas no one has ever performed a dictator game
with chimpanzees because the outcome—that they would ac-
tively give none of their windfall to others—is already known.
In ultimatum games, humans typically expect their playing
partner to expect a reasonable offer (with “reasonable” de-
pending on general cultural norms; Henrich et al. 2006),
whereas chimpanzees in the ultimatum game seem not to
take into account the needs or expectations of their playing
partner at all (Jensen, Call, and Tomasello 2007a).
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But it is not until the second step of our account (in the
section “Second Step: Group-Mindedness”) that we include
such things as group-wide social norms of fairness and the
like, and so for now, a better representative of the human
species would be children—before they have become fully
normative beings. Nevertheless, even without internalized
norms, human children are more generous with valued re-
sources than are their great ape relatives. In one fairly direct
comparison, both Silk et al. (2005) and Jensen et al. (2006)
found that when pulling in food for themselves, chimpanzees
did not care whether this also resulted in a companion getting
food. In contrast, Brownell, Svetlova, and Nichols (2009)
found that even 2-year-old children—well before they self-
govern through social norms—chose to pull food to them-
selves more often when that also meant food for their com-
panion. Chimpanzees will in some situations help others gain
access to food (Melis et al. 2011b; Warneken et al. 2007), but
only if the helper has no possibility of obtaining the food
herself.
Perhaps of most importance for the current account, hu-
man children share the spoils after collaboration in species-
unique ways. Thus, Warneken et al. (2011) presented pairs
of 3-year-old children with the same task presented to chim-
panzees by Melis, Hare, and Tomasello (2006b): a board they
had to pull in together, with food either (i) predivided on
the two ends of the board or (ii) clumped in the middle.
Unlike the apes, children collaborated readily in both of these
situations. Even more striking, in a direct comparison of spe-
cies, Hamann, Warneken, and Tomasello (2011) found that
3-year-old children shared resources more equitably if those
resources resulted from their collaborative efforts, rather than
from parallel work or no work at all, whereas chimpanzees
“shared” (allowed the other to take) to the same degree (and
infrequently) no matter how the spoils were produced (see
also Melis, Schneider, and Tomasello 2011a).
How might we account for an evolutionary transition from
the way that other great apes treat food to the way that hu-
mans treat food—especially after a collaboration? One es-
pecially plausible transitional context is scavenging. Thus, as
the genus Homo was emerging some 2 million years ago, a
global cooling and drying trend created an expansion of open
environments and a radiation in terrestrial monkeys, who
would have competed with Homo for many plant foods. Scav-
enging large carcasses killed by other animals would have been
one possible response. Such scavenging would have required
multiple participants, as other carnivores would be competing
for those carcasses as well.
Individuals would be especially well suited for scavenging
if they were tolerant of conspecifics cofeeding on a carcass
with them. An important finding in this regard is that when
experimenters pair together chimpanzee individuals who are
especially tolerant with one another in the context of food
(established by an independent food tolerance test), they are
much more likely to collaborate successfully and share the
spoils at the end than are intolerant partners (Melis, Hare,
and Tomasello 2006b). And bonobos show both more tol-
erance around food and more cooperation in obtaining and
sharing monopolizable food than do chimpanzees (Hare et
al. 2007). These findings suggest that variation in tolerance
around food among individuals of the last common ancestor
to Homo and Pan might have served as the raw material on
which natural selection worked on the way to a species that
actively shared the spoils of collaboration (Hare and Toma-
sello 2005).
It is also likely that at some point, individuals who at-
tempted to hog all of the food at a scavenged carcass would
be actively repelled by others and perhaps shunned in other
ways as well—a first step toward what Boehm (2001) calls
“counter-dominance.” Chimpanzees already engage in social
selection of collaborative partners, preferentially choosing a
partner with whom they have had success over one with
whom they have previously had difficulties (Melis, Hare, and
Tomasello 2006a). Scavenging Homo would thus have already
had a tendency to avoid dominants who tried to monopolize
the carcass. Moreover, a small coalition attacking a greedy
dominant to drive him away would have been a simple ex-
tension from driving other species away from the carcass (and
of course chimpanzees already form small social coalitions in
intragroup conflicts). The outcome of socially selecting
against dominants is of course that good cooperators get se-
lected “for” by being chosen more often as collaborative part-
ners.
As humans became ever more dependent on collaborative
foraging—and so ever more interdependent with others in
the social group—additional factors contributed to their ten-
dency to share resources with others relatively generously and
even fairly. But for now, we are interested only in the early
steps (perhaps in combination with cooperative breeding),
and our proposal is that in the context of scavenging, the
individuals who did best were those who (1) were tolerant of
others peacefully cofeeding on the same carcass and (2) did
not attempt to hog the spoils and so be socially selected against
by others for selfish behavior.
Coordination
Boesch and Boesch (1989) describe chimpanzees’ group hunt-
ing of monkeys in very human-like terms, with participants
having a shared goal and well-defined roles. Focusing on the
chimpanzees of the Taı¨ Forest (since in more open environ-
ments chimpanzees use more solo and less coordinated strat-
egies), they posit that all of the chimpanzees have the shared
goal of capturing the monkey. Then a “driver” begins chasing
a monkey, while “blockers” prevent lines of escape and an
“ambusher” attempts to make the kill. However, it is also
possible that what the chimpanzees are doing is something
less cooperative, that is, the initiating chimpanzee is attempt-
ing to capture the monkey for itself since the captor gets most
meat (or else he knows from experience that once he initiates
the chase, a group kill will often ensue and he will get at least
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some meat), and then the others go to places where they
expect to maximize their chances of capturing the fleeing
monkey, which also increases the group’s chances as an un-
intentional by-product (Tomasello 2008; Tomasello et al.
2005).
It is not that each chimpanzee is scrambling for the monkey
on its own, ignoring the others. In deciding what to do, each
participant takes into account the position of the others and
their behavior and how these might influence the monkey’s
flight. The coordination is therefore an emergent property
generated by individual decision making not aimed at that
coordination. Thus, Melis, Hare, and Tomasello (2006a)
found that in situations in which a chimpanzee could pull in
a board with food by itself, that is what it did (in preference
to opening a door for a potential partner). But if pulling in
the board required two individuals, then they would either
wait for their partner or even open a door for the other to
join. The chimpanzees were mainly interested in their own
acquisition of food, but they understood when they needed
a partner for success. Similarly, Bullinger, Melis, and Toma-
sello (2011a) and Rekers, Haun, and Tomasello (2011) found
that when chimpanzees were given the choice to obtain food
by collaborating with a partner or acting alone, they most
often chose to act alone, whereas human children most often
chose to collaborate.
Nevertheless, even though chimpanzees will go and open
a door for a necessary partner, they do not actively com-
municate about the collaboration much or at all. In the wild,
chimpanzees do vocalize their excitement at various points
throughout the hunt. But chimpanzee vocalizations, as vir-
tually all primate vocalizations, are mostly hardwired to par-
ticular stimulus and motivational states, so what is being ex-
pressed is general excitement (with the same vocalizations
used when excited about other things) and not anything about
the content of what is happening or what the vocalizer wants
to happen. There are no reported vocalizations (or gestures)
specifically associated with hunting or coordination. Indeed,
in the laboratory, several investigators have reported a striking
lack of communication among chimpanzees as they engage
in collaborative tasks (e.g., Melis, Hare, and Tomasello 2009;
Povinelli and O’Neil 2000), including in tasks in which they
had previously communicated with humans (Hirata and Fuwa
2007).
This overall picture may be clearly seen in a recent exper-
iment constructed as a Stag Hunt for pairs of chimpanzees
(Bullinger et al. 2011b). Each individual had access to a less
preferred “hare” food, which she would lose for good if she
left it. Then a highly preferred “stag” food appeared that
required the pair to work together for access (which they
knew from previous experience). Because of the risk involved,
communicating with the partner, or at least checking on the
partner before forsaking the hare in hand, would seem to be
called for. But what chimpanzees did in this situation was
almost always bolt for the stag (90% of the time when a
partner was present) without communicating or checking,
presumably optimistic that the partner would be coming also
(leader-follower strategy). They did this even in a condition
in which they could not see what the partner was doing unless
they looked around a barrier (which they did not do). If an
individual arrived at the stag first, she sometimes banged on
things to induce the other to join her, but there was no com-
munication or systematic checking of the partner ahead of
time as a way of coordinating their decisions.
Humans, in contrast, coordinate and communicate about
their decision making in such situations to form a joint goal.
To form a joint goal, we must know together that each of us
has the goal of working with the other (Bratman 1992). Know-
ing together means engaging in some form of recursive mind
reading (we each know that the other knows, etc.), which is
the basic cognitive ability that enables humans to engage in
all forms of joint and collective intentionality (Tomasello
2008, 2009), including joint attention, common conceptual
ground, and all “public” knowledge and activities. And once
they have formed a joint goal, humans are committed to it.
Thus, when their collaborative partner stops interacting with
them, even 18-month-old infants expect her to be committed,
and so they attempt in various ways to reengage her—as
opposed to human-raised chimpanzees, who do not (War-
neken, Chen, and Tomasello 2006). Slightly older children
understand and respect their own commitment, such that they
keep pursuing the joint goal until both partners have received
their reward even if they have already received theirs (Ha-
mann, Warneken, and Tomasello 2012)—which, again, is not
true of chimpanzees (Greenberg et al. 2010). And when 3-
year-olds need to break away from a joint commitment with
a partner, they even “take leave” through some form of im-
plicit or explicit communication—as a way of acknowledging
and asking to be excused for breaking the commitment (Gra¨-
fenhain et al. 2009).
Young children also understand the role of the partner in
the collaborative activity in a way that chimpanzees do not,
and they communicate about roles as well. Thus, when they
are forced to switch roles in a collaborative activity, young
children already know what to do from having observed their
partner earlier from the “other side” of the collaboration—
whereas chimpanzees seemingly do not (Tomasello and Car-
penter 2005). And even prelinguistic children communicate
with others to help them play their role in a joint activity,
for example, by using a pointing gesture to direct them to
the part of an apparatus they should be acting on—whereas,
once more, human-raised chimpanzees do not (Warneken,
Chen, and Tomasello 2006; and of course human adults com-
municate about their collaboration with language). One pos-
sible explanation for this different understanding of the roles
in the collaborative activity is that humans, but not chim-
panzees, comprehend joint activities and their different roles
from a bird’s-eye view in which all roles are interchangeable,
that is, conceptualized in an agent-neutral manner in a single
representational format. This conceptual organization enables
everything from bidirectional linguistic conventions to social
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institutions with their publicly created joint goals and indi-
vidual roles that can in principle be filled by anyone.
This brings us again to the evolutionary question. How did
early humans move from a chimpanzee mode of initiating
and coordinating Stag Hunt activities—based either on a
leader-follower strategy or on a kind of naive optimism about
the other’s actions—to the modern human mode in which
individuals coordinate their decision making through some
kind of implicit or explicit communication, resulting in a joint
commitment to follow through until everyone gets their re-
ward, with a coordination of interchangeable, agent-neutral
roles?
The main thing to note is that, given the normal feeding
ecology of chimpanzees, their approach to Stag Hunt situa-
tions makes immanently good sense—and indeed is success-
ful. Their main food sources are fruits and other vegetation,
and monkeys are an addition. A chimpanzee on its way to a
fig tree is sacrificing only a small amount of time and energy
to participate in an unsuccessful monkey hunt.2 With humans,
the hypothesis is that at some point their scavenging turned
into active collaborative hunting and gathering (perhaps with
the emergence of Homo heidelbergensis some 800 kya (thou-
sand years ago; Dubreuil 2010), with evidence for bringing
large prey back to a home base from at least 400–200 kya
(Stiner, Barkai, and Gopher 2009). The key point in the tran-
sition from chimpanzees, from a psychological point of view,
would have been when the decision making became more
challenging, in particular when the risk became such that just
optimistically leaving the hare in hand (as chimpanzees seem-
ingly do) was no longer an effective strategy. That is to say,
the situation was such that giving up the hare was no longer
so cheap that one should just go for the stag without at-
tempting to coordinate decisions with other potential hunters.
As in the case of sharing the spoils, social selection based
on reputation almost certainly played a role in all of this as
well—but in this case, not for individuals who were tolerant
around food and fair at sharing the spoils but rather for
competent coordinators and communicators who would in-
crease the likelihood of success. Clearly, humans’ skills of
coordination and communication increased continuously af-
ter their initial emergence—from pointing and pantomiming
to conventional languages—and the hypothesis is simply that
better coordinators and communicators were chosen as col-
laborative partners more often. In general, as humans went
from more passive scavenging to more active collaborative
foraging, they were faced with ever more challenging coor-
dination situations and decisions, and this provided the se-
lective context for the evolution of ever greater skills of co-
ordination and communication.
2. This may help to explain the surprising fact that chimpanzees hunt
more frequently for monkeys in the rainy season, when their fruit and
other options are actually more plentiful (perhaps because the cost of
unsuccessful monkey hunting is lower; Watts and Mitani 2002).
Temptations to Free Ride
In Stag Hunt situations with no excess of labor available (all
individuals present are needed for success), free riding is not
possible: if I do not participate, then I (and everyone else)
get nothing. The proposal is thus that the earliest manifes-
tations of human collaborative foraging were not so vulner-
able to free riding because they involved very small numbers
of collaborators, each of whom believed their participation
to be necessary. Interestingly, contemporary children seem to
have virtually no interest in free riding, as participating in
collaborations seems to be rewarding in itself (Gra¨fenhain et
al. 2009).
So how does it work in chimpanzee hunting of monkeys,
when there are often excess participants around? As noted
above, the main factor in acquiring meat in chimpanzee hunts
is being the captor. But, in addition, Boesch (1994) reports
that individuals get more meat when they are actually in the
hunt than if they are either bystanders or latecomers to the
party—suggesting the possibility that meat is divided based
on participation. But bystanders still get plenty of meat (83%
of bystanders in Taı¨ get at least some meat), and they get
more than latecomers. This suggests that the main variable
in obtaining meat is proximity to the kill at the key moment,
with the captor getting most, those in the immediate vicinity
getting next most, and latecomers getting least—a hypothesis
receiving strong support from a recent experiment (Melis et
al. 2011b). Boesch also reports that of the hunters who are
not captors, the one who obtains the most meat is the one
who best anticipates the monkey’s escape route—but they
tend to be both close to the kill site and also older individuals
who command more meat in general. Interestingly, in
Boesch’s (1994) similar analysis of the hunting of the Gombe
chimpanzees, bystanders actually get more meat than hunters.
So, overall, hunting chimpanzees would seem to have either
no, or very poor, mechanisms for controlling free riders, lead-
ing Boesch (1994:660) to ask: “Why do so many individuals
cheat, and why are they so readily accepted by hunters?”
Another interesting situation is that the individual who
begins chasing the monkey is not the one most likely to cap-
ture it (Boesch 1994). This could easily undermine group
action altogether, as each individual lags to avoid being the
first chaser. But it does not, and this is instructive of the
process. The key is that at least one individual would rather
be the dispreferred first chaser than for there to be no hunt
at all. That is, some individual must reason that if I do not
act soon, no one will get anything—and I would prefer to
get something, even if it is less than maximal (and even a
small amount of meat is valuable because it contains vital
micronutrients; Tennie, Gilby, and Mundry 2009b). In game
theory, this is the Snowdrift situation, with as many equilibria
as participants who reason in this way. Interestingly, in the
Taı¨ chimpanzees, it is most often youngsters who begin the
chase, perhaps because they have yet to learn that the first
chaser is disadvantaged (whereas the older individuals know
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this, and so lag a bit). But it also might be because youngsters
are typically more impulsive, impatient, and risk prone than
are adults.
So what do humans do about free riders? The answer is,
of course, social selection by means of reputation. Humans
have evolved extremely sensitive cheater-detection mecha-
nisms of a type never observed in chimpanzees or other great
apes (no studies have investigated apes’ partner choice with
respect to free riders)—which lead them not only to shun
free riders but sometimes even to punish them (Cosmides
1989). Because everyone knows this to be the case, individuals
are very concerned that others not think them to be laggards,
and so they have developed a concern for self-reputation,
something also never observed in other great apes. Many
experiments clearly demonstrate that humans’ concern for
their own reputation is an important incentive for coopera-
tion in many situations in which free riding would otherwise
be beneficial (Milinski, Semmann, and Krambeck 2002). In
general, to the degree that collaborative foraging becomes
obligate for survival, a reputation as a good collaborative
partner becomes obligate as well.
A mechanism related to reputation and self-reputation is
punishment. So far we have simply assumed that individuals
choose partners with good reputations and avoid those with
bad reputations. But there is also the possibility of punishing
those who do not cooperate (or rewarding those who do),
presumably both to encourage their cooperation on the spot
and also to improve their behavior for future collaborations—
and indeed such punishment has been shown to be effective
in helping to enforce cooperation in various economic games
(Boyd 2006). Humans sometimes even mete out third-party
punishment against those harming others (when they them-
selves are not being harmed), whereas chimpanzees—even
though they retaliate against those who harm them directly
(Jensen, Call, and Tomasello 2007b)—do not (Riedl et al.
2012).3 When humans are punishing a noncooperator, they
typically experience resentment or moral anger, which goes
beyond normal anger because it seems justified.
And so, lagging or free riding would not have been much
of a problem for early humans foraging together in pairs or
trios, where the participation of all is necessary for success
and where lack of participation would be easily noted and
count against reputation. When the collaboration is obligate,
the stakes are raised to the degree that there may be even
competition for partners, and in this case a concern for self-
reputation would be especially important. Note that by this
point, reputation means both (i) a more motivated collabo-
rator who will not cheat either by monopolizing the food or
by lagging and (ii) a more skillful collaborator who is better
able to form joint goals and coordinate roles. What enables
3. Chimpanzees sometimes intervene in the fights of others (so-called
policing; Flack et al. 2006). However, they are not in these interventions
punishing particular individuals for bad behavior, but only attempting
to keep a dangerous (for them) situation of conflict from escalating.
good collaborators to find one another is thus not reputation
for altruism or anything else external, but simply reputation
for being a good collaborator—which is, with actual partners
and direct observers, impossible to fake.
Interdependence and Altruistic Helping
Helping one’s partner during a mutualistic collaborative ac-
tivity pays direct dividends. If my partner has dropped or
broken his spear, it is in my interest to help him to find or
repair it, as this will improve our chances for success toward
our joint goal (and he has no incentive to now suddenly
defect, as the mutualistic situation is still operative). Mutu-
alistic collaboration thus provides a safe context within which
basic tendencies to help others could evolve (see Silk 2009).
It is thus not surprising that when Ache foragers are hunting,
they do such things for their partners as give them weapons,
clear trails for them, carry their child, repair their weapon,
instruct them in best techniques, and so on (Hill 2002). In-
terestingly, young children, but not chimpanzees, help others
more readily in the context of collaborative activities than
outside of such activities (Greenberg et al. 2010; Hamann,
Warneken, and Tomasello 2012).
But humans help one another outside of collaborative ac-
tivities as well. Indeed, in experimental settings, infants as
young as 14 months of age will help adults with all kinds of
problems, from fetching out-of-reach objects to opening
doors to stacking books (Warneken and Tomasello 2006,
2007). Perhaps surprisingly, chimpanzees also help conspe-
cifics with their problems in some similar ways (Melis et al.
2011b; Warneken et al. 2007). But humans would seem to do
it much more frequently and in a much wider array of con-
texts, including actively sharing resources and information
more freely (e.g., informing others of things helpfully and
even teaching them things; see Warneken and Tomasello 2009
for a review). Why might this be the case?
Our proposal is that obligate collaborative foraging pro-
duces interdependence among members of a group, and this
interdependence makes it in my direct interest to help others
who might be my future partners. If I can acquire food only
with the help of a partner, then when potential partners are
in trouble, I should help them—even outside of any collab-
orative activity. The logic is exactly the same as Hamilton’s
equation for kin, as worked out by Roberts (2005) in his
Stakeholder model: I should sacrifice to help potential part-
ners when
sB 1 C.
In this equation, as in Hamilton’s, B represents ultimate re-
productive benefits, and these must exceed costs, C, when the
benefits are conditioned by the stake, s, I have in the particular
partner (analogous to Hamilton’s coefficient of relatedness).
The variable s in the case of collaborative foraging simply
represents how important it is for me that an individual cur-
rently in trouble be alive and well and ready to collaborate
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with me in the future.4 To be a bit fanciful, if a particular
individual’s survival will lead to me to be successful in for-
aging to the tune of 1.3 more offspring in the future (e.g.,
because it will help me to live longer), then it will pay for
me to sacrifice for her to the tune of 1.2 fewer offspring for
me in the future. The same logic holds for many other be-
haviors in social groups, of course, so that if an alarm caller
benefits my reproductive fitness, I should help her when
needed. Clutton-Brock (2002) proposes a generalized version
of this mechanism called group augmentation: if my pros-
perity depends on my social group (for defense against pred-
ators, etc.), then it is in my interest to keep them alive and
prosperous as well.
The process is, then, a form of social selection: I help others
who do things that benefit me (more than my help costs me).
But the scenario we are proposing here is special. It is special
because if I have a stake in an alarm caller and so help her,
then what I am socially selecting for is better alarm callers
(who have keen perception, loud vocalizations, etc.). But
when the target domain is collaboration, then what is being
socially selected for is good collaborators—who are tolerant
of others in cofeeding situations, skillful at coordination and
communication, have a tendency to shun or punish free rid-
ers, help their partners, and so on.
Of course, this account still has a problem of free riding
because one can lag on the helping: my highest preference is
that someone else help my potential collaborative partner or
alarm-calling groupmate so that I do not have to bear the
costs. But as Zahavi (2003) points out, the same is true of
kin selection: it is in my interest to help my sibling because
he shares my genes, but my first preference is that someone
else help him so that I do not have to bear the costs. The
point is not that interdependence as described by the Stake-
holder model solves the problem of altruism but that, using
the same logic as kin selection, it changes the math because
my selfish benefits depend on the well-being of selected others.
Obligate collaborative foraging thus creates a logic of in-
terdependence, which leads to the selective helping of those
who will be needed as collaborative partners in the future. It
is noteworthy that whereas almost all other accounts of the
evolution of human altruism rest on one or another form of
reciprocity, reciprocity cannot explain uncontingent acts of
altruistic helping. The current account, in contrast, does not
depend on reciprocity because I am repaid for my altruistic
acts not by reciprocated altruistic acts from others, but rather
by their later mutualistic collaboration, which costs them
nothing (actually benefits them). Indeed, it has recently been
demonstrated experimentally that humans will actually com-
pete with one another to be more altruistic so that observers
4. The process is thus similar to what has been called pseudoreciprocity
(e.g., Bshary and Bergmu¨ller 2008), in which one individual “invests” in
another, who does nothing contingent in return but just what she nor-
mally would do in such circumstances.
will later choose them to engage in a mutualistic collaboration
(Sylwester and Roberts 2010).5
Summary
Bonobos, gorillas, and orangutans do not collaboratively for-
age at all. Only some chimpanzees do so and then in only
one of their many foraging activities. And the data we have
presented suggest that when chimpanzees do hunt in small
groups for monkeys, they do this with cognitive and moti-
vational mechanisms not specifically evolved for the task, that
is, they somehow manage to be successful quite often in spite
of their tendencies toward dominance in solving food dis-
putes. In contrast, humans, as already evident in young chil-
dren, have evolved a suite of cognitive and motivational mech-
anisms for sharing food cooperatively, coordinating and
communicating toward joint goals with complementary roles,
and engaging in various kinds of reputation-based social se-
lection (including a concern for self-reputation as a coop-
erator)—what we have called skills and motivations for joint
intentionality. They seem evolved for the task. Table 1 sum-
marizes the basic mechanisms involved.
Our evolutionary story so far has been highly selective. As
noted at the outset, we have backgrounded the important role
of kinship, as humans evolved more stable reproductive bonds
(resulting in an increase in male tolerance), which obviously
played an important role in the attitudes of individuals toward
one another in small groups (Chapais 2008). Further in this
context, humans also became cooperative breeders, regularly
providing child care for offspring who were not their own,
and this clearly would have affected emotions and motivations
for collaboration and altruism as well (Hrdy 2009). Most
likely, both of these processes played a key role in the earliest
stages of the story we are telling here, as humans were be-
coming more tolerant with one another around food. But, as
also argued at the outset, these kinds of processes, important
as they are, would not help us to explain the more cognitive
aspects of coordinating and communicating toward joint
goals, nor would they explain humans’ tendency to socially
select others with regard to their cooperative behaviors. To
explain these, we need not just prosocial tendencies, but joint
intentional skills and motivations for various kinds of col-
laboration.
And so a big first step in the evolution of uniquely human
cooperation is one in which the usual suspects—kin selection,
sexual selection, direct reciprocity, and indirect reciprocity—
play only minor roles. The heroes of our story are (1) mu-
tualistic collaboration and the logic of interdependence and
(2) social selection based on reputation as a good collaborator.
5. Note that if two thieves are totally interdependent—the first needs
the second to pick the lock, and the second needs the first to crack the
safe—and this is the only way they can get resources for food, then when
the police question them, there is no Prisoner’s Dilemma. Neither wants
to be set free on his own while the other stays in jail because this would
mean starvation.
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Table 1. Basic mechanisms used by great apes and humans to solve the main problems of Stag Hunt
foraging (step 1)
Apes/chimpanzees Humans
Share spoils Dominance Cooperative food sharing
Harassment and reciprocity Share more in collaboration
Partner choice Social selection against “hogs”
Coordination Leader-follower (risk taking) Joint goals and attention
No coordination by communication Agent-neutral roles
Cooperative communication
Social selection Free riders not punished Selection against free riders
Dominance Third-party punishment
Self-reputation
Altruistic helping Helping Help more in collaboration
Reciprocal sharing Cooperative sharing
No informing Informing and teaching
But still, the collaboration we are talking about here was only
small scale and ad hoc, in the sense that it existed only during
the collaboration itself; when the foraging trip was over, so
was the special “we” it had engendered. There was still some
way to go to get to human large-group cooperation and its
complex conventions, norms, and institutions.
Second Step: Group-Mindedness
Small-scale obligate collaborative foraging would seem to be
a stable form of cooperation: it is in the enlightened self-
interest of individuals to collaborate well with others and to
help their collaborative partners. But, apparently, at some
point it was not stable, as evidenced by the fact that contem-
porary humans possess a whole other level of mechanisms
for cooperation, including social conventions, norms (inter-
nalized into guilt and shame), and institutions, along with a
strong in-group bias. Why did these become necessary?
We think there were two, essentially demographic, factors:
population growth within groups, and competition between
groups. These factors probably began playing a role with the
emergence of behaviorally modern humans. Thus, Foley and
Gamble (2009) argue and present evidence (mostly from
paleo- and modern genetics) that in the Middle Pleistocene,
hominin groups (characteristic of the first step of our story)
had relatively small effective population sizes. In contrast, Hill
and Hurtado (2009) argue and present evidence that a tran-
sition to larger social groups with central-place foraging—
and comprising a hierarchical structure in which “bands”
coalesce into “tribes” or “societies”—took place basically with
modern humans and the advent of behavioral modernity (i.e.,
at the time of our second step). The result was two new sets
of challenges to human cooperators:
Large-group coordination: as groups became larger, at least
partly in competition with other groups, individuals needed
to be able to coordinate with relative strangers—while still
knowing that they were from within the group (and so had
the requisite skills and trustworthiness).
Large-group social selection: as groups became larger, again
due partly to competition with other groups, incentives for
cooperation diminished (each individual was less needed, and
reputational information was more difficult to obtain; Olson
1965), so free riding—and even active cheating—proliferated
and needed to be controlled.
With these large-group processes, we have pretty much left
the domain of factors important in the lives of nonhuman
great apes. But still, a comparison of humans’ and great apes’
proximate mechanisms for meeting these two challenges is
instructive for the question of origins. Also instructive is the
fact that human children do not participate in group-minded
things such as social norms and institutions until some time
after they have learned to collaborate effectively with others
in concrete tasks—giving at least some indirect support to
our hypothesized evolutionary sequence of collaboration be-
fore group-mindedness.
Large-Group Coordination: Cultural Practices and
Group Identification
If collaboration is the horizontal dimension of human culture,
as adults interact with one another for mutual benefit, then
cultural transmission is its vertical dimension, as adults pass
along things to children across generations. Cultural trans-
mission was very likely an important part of human social
life from the beginning of the genus Homo, as subsistence
activities became more complex and the use of tools became
more important. Being a good social learner was thus good
for individual fitness and, indeed, even chimpanzees and
orangutans socially learn from others in ways that create be-
havioral traditions that persist across generations (van Schaik
et al. 2003; Whiten et al. 1999).
But when social groups become larger, and the target of
social learning is collaborative activities in which each par-
ticipant must have some skills and trustworthiness to be a
good partner, a new set of issues arise. The problem for the
individual is to know who has the requisite skills and trust-
worthiness and, reciprocally, to make sure that others know
that I myself possess these qualities. This is accomplished by
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individuals displaying various markers of group identity that
indicate to all that they grew up in this tribe and share its
cultural practices and values. Contemporary humans have
many diverse ways of doing this, but one can imagine that
the original ways were mainly behavioral: people who talk
like me, prepare food like me, and net fish in the conventional
way—that is, those who share my cultural practices—are very
likely members of my society. And I know that others are
scrutinizing my cultural practices in this same manner.
Cultural practices are different from behavioral traditions
because their practitioners understand them as “shared” in
the group; that is, they understand them as conventional. We
have all “agreed” to do them in a particular way, even though
we all know that there are other ways we could do them. It
is thus common ground in the society that everyone expects
everyone else both to behave in the conventional way and to
expect others to behave in the conventional way (Lewis 1969).
Conventions thus require some kind of recursive mindreading
or common ground as the basis of the agreement, and this
basic ability evolved initially, as argued above, as a skill for
forming joint goals and joint attention in collaborative activ-
ities.6 Our hypothesis is that because of this cognitive re-
quirement, other great apes do not have human-like conven-
tions or cultural practices as such (only behavioral traditions;
Tomasello 2008, 2011).
Conventions generate the conformity characteristic of cul-
tural practices because it is in the individual’s interest to do
things the way that others do them so that they can effectively
coordinate—and this is especially important if one wishes to
be able to coordinate with anyone in the larger society, in-
cluding strangers. I can immediately net fish effectively and
efficiently with an in-group stranger if we both do it in the
conventional way and can expect the partner to do it in the
conventional way as well. In this connection, it is interesting
that human children are much more conformist than are
other great apes. Thus, two decades of experimental research
have shown that human children have a much stronger ten-
dency than do other apes to copy the actual actions they
observe (Tennie, Call, and Tomasello 2009a). This tendency
is so strong that both adults and children conform to others
even when they know better themselves (Asch 1956; Haun
and Tomasello 2011; see also Lyons, Young, and Keil 2007,
on children’s tendency to overimitate). Most directly, when
individuals solve some task on their own and then see other
individuals demonstrating a different solution, apes tend to
go with their own experience over the demonstration (Hru-
besch, Preuschoft, and van Schaik 2009; Marshall-Pescini and
6. Problems with the proper formulation of mutual knowledge and
similar constructs are well known. Here we simply adopt the terminology
of Clark (1996), “common ground,” to indicate the various forms of
joint attention, mutual expectations, mutual knowledge, etc.
Whiten 2008),7 whereas human children follow the demon-
stration.
In addition to pressure from growing population sizes to
conform to cultural practices, competition with other groups
helped to engender group identification. In the face of group
competition, group life in general becomes one big collabo-
rative activity, both directly for agonistic conflicts with com-
petitor groups and indirectly in competing for resources with
competitors in the same geographical area. To compete, the
society as a whole—especially as population increased and
there was increasing division of labor—had to scale up its
small-scale collaboration to form collective, society-wide
goals, plans, and collective knowledge of things in the face of
outside threats. And individuals again had to help their col-
laborative partners for these group enterprises—who at this
point comprised essentially everyone in the society, including
some strangers.
Under these conditions—within-group population growth
and between-group competition—group identification thus
became critical. Group identification may seem a fuzzy con-
cept, but many phenomena confirm its reality, most especially,
the many in-group biases that modern humans show (helping
in-group more than out-group members, caring more about
reputation with in-group than with out-group members, etc.).
Even more striking, people feel collective guilt, pride, or
shame when some member of their group does something
especially praiseworthy or blameworthy—as if they them-
selves had done it (see Bennet and Sani 2008 for this phe-
nomenon in young children). Although the process may not
be so well understood, the idea is that group identification is
a scaled-up version of the “we” intentionality that small-scale
groups of foragers might have experienced previously as they
hunted or gathered collaboratively toward a joint goal. “We”
are all in this together and are interdependent with one an-
other, as we compete for food with the barbarians from across
the river. This psychological attitude may be called group-
mindedness—underlain by skills and motivations not just of
joint intentionality with other individuals in the moment, but
of collective intentionality with the society as a whole (Tom-
asello and Rakoczy 2003).8
As far as we know, great apes do not have this same kind
of group identity or group-mindedness. Chimpanzees live in
spatially segregated groups and are hostile toward chimpanzee
strangers they meet on their borders. But this hostility is not,
7. Whiten, Horner, and de Waal (2005) claimed that in their study,
individuals of a chimpanzee group shifted their problem-solving strategy
as a result of observing demonstrators. A close inspection of the data,
however, shows that this was true of only one individual. Moreover, a
subsequent study with a different chimpanzee group failed to replicate
this result (Hopper et al. 2007).
8. Interestingly, social psychologists often distinguish two broad types
of group formation in humans: interpersonal interdependence (corre-
sponding to our small-group interdependence) and shared identity (cor-
responding to our large-group group-mindedness; e.g., Lickel, Schmader,
and Spanovic 2007).
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as far as we know, directed at other groups qua groups, based
on their different appearance or behavioral practices.
Large-Group Social Selection: Social Norms and Institutions
Cultural practices are thus conventionalizations (standardi-
zations) of the small-scale collaborative (and other) activities
of step 1 humans. Similarly, the acts of social selection by
step 1 humans were also conventionalized, leading, at step 2,
to social norms. Social norms are conventionalizations (stan-
dardizations) of the specific acts of social judgment that step
1 individuals meted out to collaborative partners. Social
norms are mutual expectations in common ground that peo-
ple behave in certain ways, where the expectations are not
just statistical but rather normative, as in you are expected
to do your part (or else!).
Social norms have two key aspects. First is their force. Social
norms have force over human behavior because, first of all,
individuals know that to participate effectively in the collab-
orative activities of the group, they must conform to the
group’s ways of doing things. Even young children enter new
situations in their culture looking for “What am I supposed
to do here? How do I do it?” (Kalish 1998). In addition, of
course, individuals do not want to suffer the consequences
of norm violations in the form of shunning or punishment.
These punitive aspects of social selection were already a part
of collaborative activities at step 1 of our story, but now, with
their conventionalization, everyone knows with everyone else
in common ground that conforming to cultural practices and
social norms is necessary for group coordination—so that
group members may view nonconformity in general as po-
tentially harmful to group life in general. Moreover, if con-
forming to social norms also displays my group identity
(which, again, we all know in common ground), my non-
conformity expresses my disdain for the opinion of this group
and for being considered a member of this group—which
makes me potentially dangerous.
Social norms can thus channel human behavior quite
strongly in certain directions. The theoretical problem is that
social norms can, in principle, channel human behavior in
any direction, including group-detrimental directions (Boyd
2006). But this potential multidirectionality is only a problem
if we envision social norms emerging in a vacuum. In our
view, because of humans’ already existing cooperative lifeways
and interdependence as evolved in step 1, social norms could
not have emerged as directionally arbitrary, but only as en-
couraging collaboration and helping and as discouraging their
opposites—since, to repeat, social norms are nothing more
than conventionalizations of the more particular acts of social
selection for cooperative behavior (and against uncooperative
behavior) of step 1 individuals. Under conditions of group
competition, social norms may be scaled up to the level of
societal life in general.
The second key aspect of social norms is their generality.
They are general, first, because they imply an objective stan-
dard against which an individual’s behavior is evaluated and
judged. These objective standards come from the fact that we
all know in common ground how the different roles in par-
ticular cultural practices need to be performed for everyone
to reap the anticipated benefit. Thus, if it is common ground
in the group that when collecting honey, the person smoking
out the bees must do it in this particular way and that if she
does not, we will all go home empty-handed, then everyone’s
behavior may be evaluated relative to this mutually known
behavioral standard. Social norms are general, second, because
they emanate not from individual opinion but from group
opinion. Thus, if dominance is not an important part of the
social interaction of the beings we are talking about here, then
the punishment of the laggard needs to be by the group as a
whole—so that when an individual enforces a social norm,
she is doing so, in effect, as an emissary of the group as a
whole (with even further objectification of the norm coming
if the enforcer is supposedly a representative of a deity). The
third source of generality of social norms is that the group
disapproval involved is aimed in an agent-neutral way at, in
principle, all individuals equally (including the self), that is,
all who know with us in common ground the social norm
and identify with our group’s lifeways. Social norms are thus
group expectations and judgments, with respect to group-
known standards, that all group members mutually expect
one another to respect.9
It is thus easy to see why people follow social norms—
following social norms coordinates their behavior with the
normative expectations of the group so as to collaborate better
and avoid punishment and/or shunning. But the reason why
people enforce social norms is not as straightforward. One
reason is again a natural tendency to want to help and protect
one’s collaborative partners and, in the spirit of group-mind-
edness, the smooth functioning of the group. When we enter
into a joint commitment to a social norm, group-minded
thinking means that we commit not only to follow it but to
see that others do too—for the benefit of both ourselves and
those with whom we are interdependent (Gilbert 1989). Thus,
when 3-year-old children observe someone doing something
that violates a previously established conventional norm, they
often object, using normative language about what people
should or ought to be doing (Rakoczy, Warneken, and Tom-
asello 2008). Nonconformists are not doing things the way
that “we” in this group do them, and this is, in a sense, a
threat to our group.
Nevertheless, there is still the problem that punishing others
on behalf of the group is costly and risky, and so there is the
problem of free riding: why not let someone else do it? One
solution would be to punish those who do not punish others
as they should. This, of course, leads to an infinite regress if
followed to its logical conclusion: individuals punishing non-
9. The common-ground assumption exempts from the force of our
social norms individuals from another social group, young children, or
mentally incompetent persons.
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punishers of nonpunishers, and so forth. And this is where
social norms help: recent mathematical models show that
when it is a group that is punishing, costs to the individual
punisher may be negligible (Boyd, Gintis, and Bowles 2010).
Another part of the solution is that we do not sanction people
who fail to enforce norms in the same way that we sanction
norm violators themselves. If you see me trying to steal some
honey, you will either try to stop me or punish me. But if a
third person watches you not trying to stop me or punish
me, her attitude toward you, the nonenforcer, while negative,
is not nearly so severe—and may not call for punishment at
all. In the model of Ellickson (2001), we punish norm vio-
lators, but we simply avoid or shun nonpunishers, which is
potentially cost free (a mathematical treatment of the problem
that goes in this general direction is presented by Pancha-
nathan and Boyd 2004).
Moreover, in practice, enforcing social norms is mostly not
necessary because individuals have already internalized them
and naturally want to conform to them. And if individuals
do violate a norm, they often punish themselves. Thus, if, in
a moment of weakness, I take some honey that is needed by
others, I will very likely feel guilty. The feeling of guilt is a
kind of self-punishment that functions to prevent me from
doing it again in the future, lessening the chances of actual
punishment (or shunning) from others. In addition, display-
ing guilt to others, if caught, signals that I know the norm,
that I know I should have followed it, and that I am punishing
myself for its violation already (hopefully evoking your em-
pathy)—which all means that I am indeed a cooperative group
member and norm-follower who just had a momentary lapse
(see Vaish, Carpenter, and Tomasello 2011 for evidence that
even young children prefer individuals who display guilt for
their transgressions). Shame is not bound up with harm in
the same way as guilt, but it is also a form of self-punishment
(Fessler 2004 emphasizes its appeasement function). I am
ashamed that I wore the wrong clothing to the wedding, and
my blushing displays that I know the norm and that I should
have followed it, so you don’t have to shun or punish me,
and you can trust me to do better in the future.
Guilt, shame, and pride are thus internalized versions of the
kind of moral indignation and approbation that humans mete
out to others who violate social norms. These norm-related
emotions thus demonstrate with special clarity that the judg-
ment being made is not my personal feeling about things but
rather the group’s. I am sanctioning myself or praising myself
as an emissary of the group. I stole the honey because I wanted
it, and I still like having it, but I feel guilty. I, as a representative
of the group’s values, am judging myself, as an individual,
negatively. It is almost certainly the case that the individuals of
no other animal species judge and evaluate themselves in this
way. And, as noted above, collective guilt and pride for the
group (based on the behavior of individuals as representatives
of the group) are perforce uniquely human as well.
Pretty much all of the cooperative mechanisms character-
istic of humans at this second step in our evolutionary story
come together in the creation of social institutions. Social
institutions are collaborative cultural practices with joint goals
and standardized roles, with social norms governing how re-
wards are dispensed, how cheaters and free riders are treated,
and so on. What is new about institutions is that they create
new statuses for individuals playing particular roles that ev-
eryone must respect; for example, we give individuals the
rights and obligations to be group “chief,” and we give “po-
lice” the rights and obligations necessary to keep within-group
peace. These new statuses exist because and only because
everyone agrees in common ground that they do; because
institutions are especially clearly public, no one may ignore
the new statuses by pleading ignorance of them (Chwe 2003).
These status functions (as Searle 1995 calls them) are essen-
tially entitlements: the group has, in essence, agreed that an
individual can and indeed should do certain specified things
immune from punishment via “normal” social norms. These
statuses are typically symbolically marked with all kinds of
official markers, and their ontological status is prefigured on-
togenetically in young children pretending socially that, for
example, this stick is a bird that can fly through the air as it
pleases (Rakoczy and Tomasello 2007).
Summary
The dynamics of small-scale collaboration worked fine for
foraging in dyads and triads of the moment. But as groups
became larger, eventually turning into tribal societies, and
groups started competing with one another for resources, new
challenges to cooperation arose. The solution was a suite of
new proximate mechanisms that we may summarize with the
term “group-mindedness.” Behavioral traditions were con-
ventionalized into cultural practices that everyone knew and
that everyone expected everyone else to know and conform
to, which facilitated individuals’ coordination with in-group
strangers. Social selection was conventionalized into group-
wide social norms, which were also part of the common
ground of the group, as was the group-wide obligation to
enforce these norms. People used conformity to the cultural
practices and social norms of the society as markers of group
identity, and everyone favored and trusted members of their
own society over others, especially as group competition
heightened. The result was a new kind of interdependence
and group-mindedness that went well beyond the joint in-
tentionality of small-scale cooperation to a kind of collective
intentionality at the level of the entire societal, that is, cultural,
group (Tomasello and Rakoczy 2003). Interestingly and im-
portantly, young children do not begin to show this kind of
group-mindedness and collective intentionality—in particu-
lar, they do not enforce social norms on others—until after
3 years of age, which is considerably after they are capable of
collaborating with other individuals toward joint goals, as in
step 1 of our story (Rakoczy, Warneken, and Tomasello 2008).
Cultural group selection may have played an important
role at this point as well, as some groups created cultural
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Table 2. Basic mechanisms used by humans (plus ape precursors) to solve the main problems of cooperative social life
in large cultural groups (step 2)
Apes/chimpanzees Humans
Large-group coordination Behavioral traditions Cultural practices
Social learning Teaching and conformity
Hostility to strangers Group markers/identification
Institutions
Large-group social selection Retaliation, intervention Self-reputation
General social emotions for affiliation, retaliation, etc. Social norms
Norm-related emotions
Cultural group selection Conformity not strong enough for coherent cultural groups Selection of best-functioning (most cooperative) groups
practices, norms, and institutions that enabled them to col-
laborate better among themselves and so to outcompete other
groups. But, as noted at the outset, cultural group selection
explains why the particular social norms and institutions of
particular cultural groups prevailed, and this assumes species-
universal skills and motivations for creating social norms and
institutions in the first place. We thus view cultural group
selection as a critically important component in the process
leading to modern human cooperation in large-scale societies,
but only fairly late in the process, that is, after our second
step, in which human groups began their truly cultural life
in larger societies. In any case, a summary of the specific
proximate mechanisms and group processes involved in step
2 of our account, and some of their possible evolutionary
precursors in other great apes, is presented in table 2.
Conclusion
Modern theories of the evolution of human cooperation tend
to focus either on small-scale cooperation early in human
evolution or on group-level cooperation later in the process
with the advent of modern humans (or even later, with ag-
riculture). We believe, however, that the full story will require
an account that incorporates both of these levels and evo-
lutionary periods.
Small-group collaboration, in our account, is not solely
about kinship and reciprocity, as in most accounts, though
these undoubtedly played some role. Kinship and reciprocity
are important in the lives of almost all primates, so if they
were the whole story, it would be hard to see how humans
came to their distinctive lifeways and social organization. Kin-
ship and reciprocity do not get you culture. Instead, we have
hypothesized a change of ecology that led humans to an in-
terdependent lifestyle, especially collaborative foraging, which
resulted in the evolution of new skills and motivations for
collaborating with others (joint intentionality) and gave in-
dividuals special incentives for helping their partners altru-
istically as well. The emergence of more stable reproductive
bonds and cooperative breeding undoubtedly played impor-
tant roles in the emotional-motivational side of things at this
early period as well, but contrary to what is implied by Burkart
and van Schaik (2010), we do not believe that if chimpanzees
became cooperative breeders that human-like social-cognitive
skills and shared intentionality would automatically result.
What is needed, in addition, is new cognitive challenges such
as those presented by collaborative foraging: the need to co-
ordinate with others toward joint goals, the need to master
with others complex skills and technologies, and the need to
communicate these skills and technologies to others within
and across generations. In our view, cooperative child care
fits in very well with a lifestyle of collaborative foraging, so
the cooperative breeding and cooperative foraging accounts
go very well together.
Group-level cooperation was then built upon the cognitive
and motivational foundations of small-scale collaboration.
Creating cultural conventions, norms, and institutions at the
level of the social group as a whole requires a new way of
thinking in which there is a “we” that constitutes not just my
current partners in a collaborative enterprise but all of us in
this society. This new way of thinking—that we are a “we”—
very likely evolved in response to group competition, as each
group had to “circle its wagons.” Group-mindedness thus
relies on a kind of collective intentionality in which all mem-
bers of the group participate, both following and enforcing
the norms that define the group and stabilize its cooperative
activities. At this point, cultural group selection undoubtedly
played an important role as well. But it could play that role
only after humans had evolved the kind of group-mindedness
that is the mark of human cultural organization in the first
place. Thus, cultural group selection cannot help us much
with the cognitive dimension of human collaboration—which
at this level means the creation of cultural conventions,
norms, and institutions—which is the target of cultural group
selection, not its creation.
And so, for us, it is all about the evolution of a distinctively
new, un-chimp-like lifestyle that required both emotional-
motivational and cognitive adaptations. The key ecological
change was one that made individual human beings inter-
dependent with one another for subsistence, which led nat-
urally to helping those on whom one was dependent. This
required the development of cognitive skills for putting one’s
head together with others in acts of mutualistic collaboration
and communication. It also required individuals suppressing
certain selfish tendencies, for example, for hogging all the
spoils or for free riding on the efforts of others. The ability
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to suppress selfishness resulted, we would argue, from another
aspect of the logic of interdependence, social selection, in
which there arises a kind of market for collaborative partners
such that anyone with a poor reputation will be avoided. In
order to be chosen, one needs to appear to others to be a
good partner, and the best way to do that is to actually be a
good partner—which means good cognitive skills for coor-
dination and communication, sharing the spoils peacefully
with others, shunning and punishing noncooperators, con-
cerns for self-reputation as a cooperator, and so forth. This
logic of interdependence and resulting social selection scales
up to the level of the whole society if all of its members are
interdependent because they are in competition with other
groups and so have become group-minded.
This account is, of course, speculative. Ethnographies of
modern-day foragers may not be representative of the earlier
periods in human evolution in which we are interested, and
the paleo-anthropological record is far from definitive on any
of the important issues. We have thus supplemented these tra-
ditional anthropological forms of evidence with comparative
experimental data on similarities and differences in the skills
and motivations for cooperation between contemporary hu-
man children and other great apes. Here the data are quite
clear that contemporary humans have some specific skills and
motivations for collaboration and cooperative communication
not possessed by other great apes, at least not in the same way.
And, importantly, these can be theoretically connected to the
specific challenges presented by collaborative foraging—as rep-
resented by the Stag Hunt from game theory—which provides
further evidence for collaborative foraging as a key context for
the evolution of uniquely human skills and motivations for
cooperation and shared intentionality.
In any case, what the current account makes abundantly
clear is just how difficult it is to establish and maintain co-
operation in complex social organisms. Humans have all kinds
of species-unique skills and motivations specifically designed
to support cooperation, but still we are very, very far from
perfect cooperators. Cooperation is really difficult.
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Comments
Ian C. Gilby
Department of Evolutionary Anthropology, Duke University, Box
90383, Durham, North Carolina 27708, U.S.A. (ian.gilby@duke
.edu). 16 V 12
I applaud Tomasello et al. for highlighting the role of mu-
tualism in the evolution of human cooperation. In chimpan-
zees and bonobos, which often serve as models of the last
common ancestor of apes and humans, the importance of
mutualism is often overlooked in favor of altruism-based
mechanisms common in the genus Homo. Mutualism explains
the majority of non-kin cooperation in the animal kingdom
(Dugatkin 1997); therefore, it is critical to understand its role
in the development of the uniquely high levels of cooperation
in humans. With this said, I must make it clear that I am not
arguing that altruism-based cooperation is entirely absent in
nonhuman primates. Indeed, several studies have provided
experimental and correlational evidence for reciprocal ex-
change, albeit typically characterized by short delays and low
costs (Clutton-Brock 2009). However, I feel that mutualistic
explanations for cooperation in chimpanzees and bonobos
have not received research attention in proportion to their
biological importance.
I study hunting and meat-sharing among wild chimpanzees
in two East African communities—Kasekela (Gombe National
Park, Tanzania) and Kanyawara (Kibale National Park,
Uganda), and I would like to echo the authors’ emphasis on
the mutualistic nature of group hunts of red colobus monkeys
at these sites. In fact, I argue that group hunting by chim-
panzees may be even simpler than Tomasello et al. claim.
They use the game-theoretical model of the Stag Hunt as a
tool for understanding chimpanzee hunting. In the most im-
portant respect, this is a valid approach—as the number of
hunters increases, each individual has a greater chance of
obtaining meat. Thus, there is selection on the individual to
participate, as long as others are already doing so. However,
Tomasello et al. point out that the Stag Hunt hinges on the
assumption that “all solo alternatives must be forsaken
(risked) in order to collaborate,” which is clearly not the case
in a chimpanzee hunt. The alternative prey (vegetation) re-
mains a viable option if a hunt fails. In fact, the existence of
a high-quality alternative food source (ripe drupe fruits) in-
creases hunting probability at Kanyawara, even after the con-
comitant occurrence of large groups is controlled for (Gilby
and Wrangham 2007). Thus, it would seem that the costs of
hunting (at least with regard to missed alternative foraging
opportunities) are negligible.
As an alternative to the Stag Hunt, Richard Wrangham,
Richard Connor, and I have argued that group hunting by
chimpanzees may be driven by a simple by-product mutu-
alism (Gilby and Connor 2010; Gilby, Eberly, and Wrangham
2008) by which each individual’s selfish actions incidentally
benefit others (Brown 1983). Each male hunts for himself but
experiences an increased chance of success when others hunt.
There is growing evidence that certain males act as hunting
catalysts by being the first to act. At both Kanyawara (Gilby,
Eberly, and Wrangham 2008) and Gombe (Gilby, Pusey, and
Wilson, forthcoming), hunts were significantly more likely to
occur if at least one of two particular males was present when
a party encountered red colobus than if both were absent.
This suggests that once one of these “impact males” begins
hunting, the prey’s defenses are compromised, reducing the
potential costs for other hunters.
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Given this evidence in favor of by-product mutualism, I
enthusiastically agree with Tomasello et al. that group hunting
by chimpanzees may arise as “an emergent property generated
by individual decision making not aimed at . . . coordination.”
I am also particularly pleased at their observation that indi-
vidual decision making does not mean that hunting is a mad
scramble during which all hunters ignore each other. Instead,
“in deciding what to do, each participant takes into account
the position of the others and their behavior, and how these
might influence the monkey’s flight”—that is, a by-product
mutualism may result in differentiated roles (as described at
Taı¨ [Boesch 2002]), without involving shared goals and in-
tentions.
Nevertheless, chimpanzee hunting is probably not as simple
as I have made it out to be in this comment. For example,
it is becoming clear that above a certain threshold number
of hunters, when bystanders obtain meat at predictably high
rates, individuals refrain from hunting (Gilby, Eberly, and
Wrangham 2008). This suggests that receiving meat in any
amount is beneficial, probably due to concentrated micro-
nutrients (Tennie, Gilby, and Mundry 2009b). Therefore, a
greater understanding of the nutritional benefits of meat for
chimpanzees will be critical for unraveling the complex dy-
namics of group-level foraging in humans’ closest living rel-
atives.
In sum, while we differ on some of the finer points, I
applaud the authors’ two-step scenario of the evolution of
human cooperation. Their invocation of mutualism in the
context of cooperative foraging as a step toward altruism-
based human cooperation is compelling.
Kristen Hawkes
Department of Anthropology, University of Utah, 270 South 1400
East, Salt Lake City, Utah 84112, U.S.A. (hawkes@anthro.utah
.edu). 29 V 12
Stag Hunts or Rearing Environments?
Tomasello et al. have made the case that shared intentionality
distinguishes humans from our nearest living relatives. What
accounts for the difference? The answer they offer is Stag Hunt
choices faced by ancestral foragers. Noting problems with that
answer, I urge attention to a promising alternative stimulated
by Tomasello et al.’s own findings. It comes from Sarah Hrdy,
who posed the question, “Why us and not them?” The answer
she nominated is distinctive rearing environments in our lin-
eage, with consequences for selection on motives and capac-
ities for social engagement at the youngest ages.
Tomasello and his collaborators have produced an extensive
body of results from experiments with chimpanzees and hu-
man children, demonstrating that very young—even pre-
verbal—children display an eagerness for social engagement
not found in our nearest living relatives. As indicated in the
paper here, the experimental evidence gets richer all the time.
Building on this and a long history of findings in social phi-
losophy and developmental psychology, Tomasello et al. have
hypothesized that the evolution of shared intentionality was
a crucial antecedent to human language and the socially con-
structed worlds in which we live our cultural lives.
If shared intentionality is key to so much, explanations for
it become especially important. Here and elsewhere, the ex-
planation Tomasello et al. favor is the Stag Hunt. This parable
is an assurance game in which cooperation is easily achieved
because players take the risk of abandoning pursuit of a hare
they could capture alone in anticipation of the greater benefit
from capturing a stag by cooperating (but see Brosnan et al.
2011). Here Tomasello and colleagues argue that chimpanzee
pursuit of monkeys may also fit the Stag Hunt. But does it?
When a chimpanzee leaves a fig tree to join a monkey hunt,
the figs don’t run away. Stag-versus-hare alternatives are not
obvious for ancestral hominin foragers either. The authors
say the parable “can easily be extended to other foraging
activities, including many gathering activities,” but they do
not elaborate. Their examples are big-game hunting in the
middle Pleistocene and scavenging—competitive and pas-
sive—before that. Behavior presumed in these cases is barely
sketched—perhaps because the exercise is a thought experi-
ment. Still, a thought experiment should specify imagined
alternatives. The parable is not a good fit for solitary big-
game hunting among living foragers in the arid African tropics
(e.g., Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton-Jones 2001). Modern
technology (bows and arrows) likely alters payoffs but does
not prevent useful application of ethnographic lessons to the
hunting and competitive scavenging past (O’Connell et al.
2002). As for passive scavenging, where is the stag when the
usual gain is only cranial contents and bone marrow that
can’t run away?
Focus on Stag Hunts leaves no space for Hrdy’s (2009)
cooperative breeding hypothesis. Although it is mentioned in
passing, her specific arguments about ancestral rearing en-
vironments and the evolution of shared intentionality are not.
Findings from Tomasello’s own group about the sociality of
very young children play an important role in her synthesis.
Because human mothers, unlike other apes, depend on helpers
in child rearing, they have next babies before the previous
one is independent. That means maternal concern about the
new infant trades off with concern about potential helpers
and other still-dependent offspring. So, human infants, unlike
other apes, cannot count on their mother’s undivided atten-
tion. In this rearing environment, the welfare of infants and
youngsters depends heavily on their own ability to engage the
commitment of mothers and others, with selection for those
capacities especially strong in high-mortality environments.
A contender to explain the origin of these rearing envi-
ronments is the grandmother hypothesis, favored because it
accounts for distinctive human postmenopausal longevity,
later maturity, and shorter birth intervals compared to the
other great apes (Blurton Jones, Hawkes, and O’Connell 1999;
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Hawkes 2003; Hawkes et al. 1998; O’Connell, Hawkes, and
Blurton Jones 1999). Hrdy’s cooperative breeding hypothesis
(2009) casts its comparative net much wider than the apes
and does not privilege grandmothers among possible helpers.
But most important here is that Hrdy points to selection
pressures on infant sociality that arise from the challenges
posed by maternal reliance on help from whatever source.
Tomasello and colleagues give indirect support to the prior
importance of rearing environments for our prosociality by
suggesting that developmental timing may be a guide to evo-
lutionary sequence. Their own evidence shows distinctive hu-
man appetites for mutual orientation and joint activities in
children much too young to forage—collaboratively or oth-
erwise. The early appearance of these motivations and ca-
pacities suggests they are adaptations to challenges faced at
those early ages. That developmental timing is directly con-
sistent with Hrdy’s proposal that distinctive human proso-
ciality began initially as a consequence of the rearing envi-
ronments that emerged as ancestral mothers relied enough
on help that they bore the next baby before the previous one
could feed itself.
Kim Sterelny
Philosophy Program, Research School of the Social Sciences, Aus-
tralian National University, 0200 Canberra, Australian Capital Ter-
ritory, Australia (kim.sterelny@anu.edu.au). 10 V 12
I agree with the core argument of this paper, having developed
a similar argument in Sterelny (2007). So my comments high-
light differences in emphasis, not different models of human
cooperation. That said, I agree that cooperative foraging was
an early-evolving, central factor in the human cooperation
explosion, but in coevolutionary interaction with reproduc-
tive and informational cooperation, rather than being its
prime driver. Even when we focus on ecological cooperation,
mutualistic teamwork complements other factors. Coopera-
tion generates benefit in two ways: (i) through collective ac-
tion in teamwork, as groups of agents secure resources (or
escape dangers) that none could secure by themselves and (ii)
through risk management. Dispersed search is more efficient
that a band searching together; variation in return is con-
trolled if individuals target different resources. Risk manage-
ment is important to those with limited storage, so bet hedg-
ing, and division of labor (by sex or age) was probably an
early form of cooperation, coevolving with collective foraging.
In the early phase of the cooperation explosion, free-rider
control was a more pressing problem than the paper supposes.
Collective foraging was never a pure coordination problem.
Even if hunting (or bully scavenging) teams were originally
so small that every player was needed, there would still be a
temptation to minimize the risk costs of participation; not to
be the player closest to the leopard, banging your stick; or
not to be the first to stab at a wildebeest breaking through a
cordon. Perhaps more important, there are trade-offs between
redundancy, reliability, and free-riding opportunities. If every
player is needed, it takes only one mistake, failure of nerve,
or unlucky moment for the hunt to miscarry. Returns will
be fragile. Redundant players make success more robust but
open free-riding opportunities. Sanctions, perhaps through
partner choice, must have been available close to the begin-
ning of cooperation takeoff. These sanctions were not free:
exclusion risks making enemies. That risk is never trivial:
forager societies are very cooperative, but with very high rates
of interpersonal violence (Seabright 2010).
The paper somewhat undersells the role of scavenging in
step 1. Lions get much of their food by driving other predators
from their kills, and a pack of erectines with crude spears and
good throwing arms could have driven leopards and the like
from a kill. Predators cannot afford injury, and a leopard
(say) guarding a kill is a stationary target for volleys of thrown
rocks. Wrangham (2009) argues persuasively that even ha-
bilenes show signs of an improved, richer diet. If so, it is
likely that increasingly collaborative, increasingly obligate, col-
lective foraging had deep roots in increasingly effective, ag-
gressive, scavenging packs. Aggressive scavenging is a plausible
pathway to cooperation because its profits are high while its
cognitive preconditions are light: the hominin band must stay
together in a dense pack, make as much noise as possible,
throw as hard as they can. Scavenging is not passive (as the
paper notes in passing), but it requires no complex coordi-
nation or role differentiation.
A final comment: step 2 seems to compress two separate
transitions into one. Group-mindedness seems to have
evolved by the later Pleistocene (perhaps by 75 kya), with
material symbols and regional style established in the physical
record (Henshilwood and Dubreuil 2011). This “symbolic
behavior” is often interpreted as advertising group member-
ship and/or individual status, though these issues are not
resolved (Sterelny 2011). However, there seem to be two late
Pleistocene transitions in social, demographic, and economic
complexity. One is associated with the emergence of behav-
iorally modern humans, perhaps by about 75 kya. The other
is at the Pleistocene-Holocene transition, with the emergence
of farming and sedentary life. Only at this point do the factors
the paper emphasizes become central: groups really did be-
come large enough so that cooperating with strangers became
a real issue, just at the time that competition between groups
intensified (Seabright 2010). Despite Bowles’s claims to the
contrary, neither his own data nor theory supports the claim
that group-group competition was cutthroat through the
Pleistocene (Bowles 2009; Kelly 2005). Group-mindedness
comes before large groups.
In short, there are some differences in emphasis between
my work and that of Tomasello and colleagues, but their core
hypothesis is on the money.
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Reply
We are very grateful for the sympathetic and constructive
critiques of our paper. The divergences of opinion that have
arisen are, by and large, a matter of emphasis and detail, rather
than substantive disagreements. Nevertheless, we appreciate
the opportunity to clarify three key points with regard to (1)
the status of the Stag Hunt metaphor, (2) the relation of our
hypothesis to the cooperative breeding hypothesis, and (3)
the evolutionary timing of the transition to group-minded-
ness.
The Stag Hunt as a Model for Cooperation
The Stag Hunt model is game-theoretic tool whose intended
use is metaphorical, rather than literal. And while we do see
collaborative foraging as having played a centrally important
role in the evolution of human-specific cooperative capacities,
the applicability of the model is not restricted to foraging
activities.
The Stag Hunt refers to any situation in which multiple
individuals gain payoff benefits from successfully collaborat-
ing, these benefits are greater than acting alone, and individ-
uals engaged in collaboration sacrifice in some way. Thus,
Gilby’s and Hawkes’s point is well taken, that when chim-
panzees launch a hunt for a monkey, alternative foraging
potential in the form of vegetation may not be lost. The “solo
alternative,” which is lost in this case, may be more akin to
an individual’s personal energetic reserves, safety, or time that
might have been devoted to courtship, mating, or resting.
Indeed, the only difference between the Stag Hunt and Gilby
and Connor’s (2010) “by-product mutualism” model of co-
operation appears to be simply that an alternative potential
to cooperation is actually specified in the model. Likewise,
whatever is represented by the stag in such a situation need
not be mobile prey, or prey at all. For instance, collective
defense of some scavengeable remains or engagement in col-
lective group defense may benefit an individual far beyond
an attempt to defend the carcass or themselves in a solo effort.
Given that the Stag Hunt is a metaphor for the payoffs
entailed in a coordination problem, we agree with Sterelny
that, in addition to collaborative foraging, multiple forms of
cooperation played an important role in contributing some-
thing toward a “human cooperative suite” (see Sterelny 2011),
including scavenging, reproductive cooperation, and coop-
erative breeding (see Chapais 2010; Hrdy 2009). We simply
argue that at an early stage, the benefits of cooperation and
the dynamics of interdependence would have largely back-
grounded any potential free-rider problem.
Hawkes’s plea for actual examples in addition to hypo-
thetical scenarios is also well taken. We envisage that, in small
groups, targeted hunting of prime adult bovids and cervids,
which was well established in the late Pleistocene (but oc-
curred also in the middle Pleistocene; Stiner 2002), as well as
the scavenging activities that appear to functionally precede
this, may well have been Stag Hunt–type situations. The sol-
itary big-game hunting of many of today’s foragers (e.g.,
Hawkes, O’Connell, and Blurton-Jones 2001) does not stand
in contradiction to this: the Broad Spectrum Revolution over
the past 40,000 years involved a drastic expansion of the hom-
inin subsistence base and, critically, the emergence of projec-
tile weaponry such as spears, and bows and arrows (Stiner
2001). This would have dramatically reduced the risk asso-
ciated with any stag-type pursuit. But Stag Hunt problems
continue to present themselves, even in contemporary for-
aging populations: Alvard and Nolin (2002) show, for in-
stance, that whale-hunting practices in the Lamelera of In-
donesia conform well to such a payoff structure: an
individual’s returns from a collaborative whale hunt are nu-
tritionally superior to those attained by solitary fishing, but
riskier. Nevertheless, group norms for sharing the spoils here
appear to enable coordination to great success.
The Role of Cooperative Breeding
Hrdy’s cooperative breeding hypothesis (2009) elegantly doc-
uments a mechanism by which extramaternal support in early
child-rearing environments enabled reduced interbirth inter-
vals in females and the bearing of offspring with extended
developmental phases. We fully acknowledge the profound
significance of such novel breeding environments in perhaps
providing a context for the development of human-specific
prosocial emotions and motivations. But we offer two caveats.
The first is that it is difficult to see how cooperative breeding
alone could explain the sophisticated cognitive components
of human shared intentionality. Cooperative breeders such as
the callitrichids are, of course, unusual in their cooperative
tendencies, but these manifest themselves in action primarily
in the form of infant carrying, shared vigilance, and food
provisioning, where the requirement for simultaneous actual
coordination is low, and there is typically some delay between
each individual’s investment (for an overview, see Burkart,
Hrdy, and van Schaik 2009). In searching for the evolutionary
home of an ability to coordinate actions, form shared goals
and joint commitments, monitor and reverse designated roles,
communicate relevant information and action plans, and
share resources dependently upon prior collaboration (see
Tomasello et al. 2005), activities such as collaborative foraging
appear to more obviously demand not just all of these, but
all of them simultaneously. (Cultural institutions and lan-
guage, from our second evolutionary step, make the point
even more strongly.)
In addition, the fact that high levels of cooperativeness and
prosociality emerge early in human ontogeny does not mean
that they were directly selected for in infancy. Traits that are
adaptive in adulthood often have ontogenetic pathways that
begin in childhood, as long as these early forms are not mal-
adaptive for children.
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The Evolutionary Emergence of
Group-Mindedness
Sterelny takes late Pleistocene archeological remains indicat-
ing symbolic behavior and regional style as evidence for the
emergence of group-mindedness. But he suggests that the key
factors that we cite as driving this emergence (rising group
sizes and intergroup conflict) appear only much later, at the
Pleistocene-Holocene transition. He thus concluded that
“group-mindedness comes before large groups.”
There is little dispute that upper Paleolithic hominins were
symbolically modern (Bar-Yosef 2002). However, the claim
that symbolic competence emerged with a “creative explo-
sion” in upper Paleolithic Eurasia (see, e.g., Chase and Dibble
1987) is contested: symbolic behavior and marking may have
much earlier roots in middle Stone Age Africa, as evidenced,
for example, by burial remains and potentially symbolic use
of red ochre pigment for symbolic marking (McBrearty and
Brooks 2000).
We in no way intend to resolve this debate. Rather, we
highlight that utilitarian arguments against, for example, the
symbolic use of ochre for group marking (e.g., that it may
have been used to enhance visibility or to increase perceived
threat; Sterelny 2011) may just point to an early stage in the
emergence of the medium as symbolic: status functions
emerge as humans collectively come to regard some natural
or brute phenomenon (typically, actions or objects) as having
a special meaning (Searle 1995). So media that were used for
symbolic group marking are expected to enter the archeo-
logical record for utilitarian functions initially. And there is
some evidence that group size increases long before the Pa-
leolithic may have created selection pressures related to main-
taining group cohesion: since community size and complexity
correlate with neocortex ratio in anthropoid primates (Dun-
bar 1993, 2009), group sizes can be estimated for early hom-
inins (Aiello and Dunbar 1993). Rather than indicating any
significant change in size around the Holocene, these esti-
mates suggest that group numbers progressed toward critical
levels over the middle Pleistocene, with the emergence of
Homo heidelbergensis between 400,000 and 150,000 years ago.
At this time, it is suggested, new mechanisms for maintaining
within-group social cohesion would have become of para-
mount importance.
Finally, increases in group size and intergroup conflict may
not have temporally co-occurred in driving the emergence of
group-mindedness. It is conceivable that with increasing
group sizes, initially functional behaviors (such as foraging
techniques or utilitarian uses of red ochre) began to function
as useful conventional indicators of group membership, aid-
ing in-group members in their choices of whom to coordinate
with and whom to trust. At a later point, increasingly routine
intergroup conflicts might have partially transformed the rel-
evance of these internal group signals to the status of between-
group cultural markers.
—Emily Wyman, Michael Tomasello, Alicia Melis,
Claudio Tennie, and Esther Herrmann
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